


[Download] Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Asian Security Studies)

Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Asian Security Studies)

William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, Anna B. Puglisi
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William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, Anna B. Puglisi : Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Asian Security Studies) before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Asian Security Studies):

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Organizations ExplainedBy CustomerThe book, Chinese Industrial

Espionage, is unique because it gives a comprehensive index to hundreds of the Chinese organizations involved with acquiring technology from the West. The book explains the push and pull in their organizational pecking orders, and it carefully unties the Chinese Gordian knot of interrelated local, academic, military, and national organizations. These groups are all extracting engineering and intellectual capital from the West and the USA, for their own Chinese uses. And those extractions are without regard to US patents, copyrights, restricted export, or national security law. This is a detailed description of the leading Western technologies gained by China at little cost to them. Because of the extensive amount of translated Chinese data in the book, the book is a must for the shelf of the serious analyst. The chapter about Traditional Chinese Espionage opened and clarified several subjects. The author explains that Chinese intelligence collection tradecraft is comparable with that of other advanced nations. Computer intrusion capabilities also are very sophisticated but they are treated in their own chapter. The Chinese are not just thousands of people picking up what they can, one grain of sand at a time, the "vacuum-cleaner" approach. No, there are organizational processes, collection priorities, targeting, and then a variety of modern technical and traditional initiatives to acquire specific data. The Chinese always carefully weigh stealing secrets versus inducing people to give secrets away. Not to be scorned, the Chinese are good, very good at what they do to get what they want. This book provides excellent examples and intimately describes how their collection process is professionally organized. Plans for this book were laid down in November 2004. It takes a long time to write, get approval, and publish such a book. My hat is off to the authors. Not included in this new book are current examples of those higher level political, business, and profit interrelationships that explain how Chinese organizations are assisted by worthy Western associates. But as two of the authors are employed by the U S Government, their self-censorship is necessarily imposed. So they stick only to the technical but not the political facts: a mass of technologies is gone to China; the transfers were not legal; many types of Chinese organizations were busy in getting these technologies; and the techniques to get them are both old and new and still not fully understood. Background notes are below:

- Those 1980-1999 technology transfer and economic activities are discussed in detail in The Cox Report. More current items are outlined in good detail by the National Counterintelligence Executive's bi-annual reports to congress: http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/index.php
- Washington Times on 25 March 1997 has an article titled "Famous names well paid to support China" and mentioned Messrs. Kissinger and Haig as key figures in the lobbying campaign to seek expanded U.S.-China relations. The article stated: "Both former Cabinet secretaries have received lucrative fees as deal-makers for business-clients with ventures in China, and both have a large financial stake in expanding U.S.-China trade relations..." However, according to the article, the two are not registered with the Justice Department as foreign agents, and the multi-million dollar business campaign to retain China's MFN-status and gain its entry into the WTO "...strains the limits of the lobbying disclosure law and possibly violates the Foreign Agents Act. The article also mentions that Mr. Haig is "honorary senior adviser" to China's government-controlled maritime operation, COSCO, the shipping corporation which, in a shady deal, was intended to take over the closed U.S. naval facilities in Long Beach, California.
- "The Coming Conflict With China" is a book by former bureau chiefs in China Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro. In an extensive expose; in chapter 4, titled "The New China Lobby," they describe how Messrs. Kissinger, Eagleburger, Scowcroft, Cyrus Vance, Alexander Haig and other former high-level officials influence US policy towards China often at the expense of a democratic Taiwan and get paid large amounts of money to "advise" corporate clients interested in doing business in China. https://wikispooks.com/ISGP/organisations/introduction/1997_04_Taiwan_Communique_Haig_Kiss_Feinstein_Aks.htm

I wish to give an observation that might shed some perspective. What the US is suffering today with China, it has suffered many times before:

- The Russians had their New Economic Policy in the 1920s. One example is of the Russian plan in their five year cycles, to get a western auto manufacturing plant built in Russia, then nationalize it and thus capture the technology and machinery. They convinced Henry Ford to build the auto production plant in Russia. He did build it and the Russians nationalized it on their schedule. Something akin is found here in a video that describes General Motors in China: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lvl5Gan69Wob>
- In the early 1970s, the US policy of détente with Russian led to a massive Russian technology transfer program that milked the West for all the Russians could get. The Farewell case provides an example. Between the spring of 1981 and early 1982, KGB Colonel Vetrov gave the French [who gave them to the USA] almost 4,000 secret KGB documents dated from the late 70s and early 80s. Included were comprehensive breakdowns of the Russian espionage targets for scientific, industrial, and technical information and their analyses of the successes that the acquisition programs were having. Maybe someday the Chinese version will come our way too.
- It appears that there is a mirror image with Russia and China from 1980. The Chinese have demonstrated that they are successfully on a par with the Russians in 1982 but now they have the internet to surf as well as a large ethnic pool to fish within that the Russians didn't have. But what has the U.S. learned? The People's Republic of China going back to the early 1980s has changed from being a friend that was anxious to have our support to being a power that has made a conscious effort to replace the former Soviet Union as a superpower rival of the United States. In 1980 the Chinese decided to change their business model and bring Western technology and money to China. Were they using the lessons learned from Lenin's New Economic Policy from the 1920s? The authors shared this closing overview with me and I agree with them because it

adds an important perspective. Fortunately, most Chinese who move to the USA, Canada, the West, manage their lives just fine without the hyphenated expression 'Chinese-American'; and have as little concern for ancestry as I do for my ancestors in England, Scotland, Ireland and places in between. In America, it's not supposed to matter. That fact gets lost on Chinese technology outreach personnel inside China who imagine that ethnic Chinese or, in their wilder dreams, the whole world, owe China a debt of gratitude. And, thus inspired with a messianic enthusiasm, they press on and on in their quest to acquire all that they can. We are inundated with stories of impending doom. This story of bleeding American intellectual capital and technology should be added to the list but portrayed in a way that is fair to Americans of Chinese ancestry who share our country's fate. There is no yellow peril, just a perilous regime acting in its own interest against us.

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Four Stars
By RICHARD F WICKER III
Weak ending -0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Insightful and informative. Provides an in-depth insight into how ...
By Young Cho
Insightful and informative. Provides an in-depth insight into how China works.

This new book is the first full account, inside or outside government, of China's efforts to acquire foreign technology. Based on primary sources and meticulously researched, the book lays bare China's efforts to prosper technologically through others' achievements. For decades, China has operated an elaborate system to spot foreign technologies, acquire them by all conceivable means, and convert them into weapons and competitive goods—without compensating the owners. The director of the US National Security Agency recently called it "the greatest transfer of wealth in history." Written by two of America's leading government analysts and an expert on Chinese cyber networks, this book describes these transfer processes comprehensively and in detail, providing the breadth and depth missing in other works. Drawing upon previously unexploited Chinese language sources, the authors begin by placing the new research within historical context, before examining the People's Republic of China's policy support for economic espionage, clandestine technology transfers, theft through cyberspace and its impact on the future of the US. This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese politics, Asian security studies, US defence, US foreign policy and IR in general.

'In a book likely to annoy and please in equal measure, the authors use Chinese-language sources, often from public policy documents, to describe a system that has at its core not the attention-grabbing issue of cyberespionage, but human-based, meticulous, often open-source acquisition that involves multiple actors at all levels of the party and state, and appeals to the patriotism of Chinese abroad.' -- New York Times
'This book rings alarm bells about technology theft on a scale that the authors say is unprecedented in history and that they believe has strategic implications.' -- Foreign Affairs
About the Author
William C. Hannas has an MA from the University of Chicago in Chinese and a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania in Asian languages. He served with the US Navy and Joint Special Operations Command, taught at Georgetown University, and holds a senior executive position in a component of the US federal government. Hannas is author of *Asia's Orthographic Dilemma* (1997) and *The Writing on the Wall: How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity* (2003). James Mulvenon is Vice-President of Defense Group, Inc.'s Intelligence Division and Director of DGI's Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. Trained as a Chinese linguist, he is a leading expert on Chinese cyber issues, and has published widely on Chinese military affairs, party-army relations, C4ISR, and nuclear weapons doctrine and organizations. He has a PhD in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and is author of *Soldiers of Fortune* (2000). Anna B. Puglisi has an MPA and MS in environmental science from Indiana University, has worked in research and technical infrastructure, and now holds a senior analyst position in a component of the US federal government. Ms. Puglisi studied at the Princeton in Beijing Chinese language school and was a visiting scholar in Nankai University's Department of Economics, where she studied China's ST policies, infrastructure development, and university reforms.